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THE LAW RELATING TO DEPOSITS RECEIVED
BY INSOLVENT BANKS.1
A bank -is legally viewed in a double aspect, as a bailee
and as a debtor. In receiving a special deposit that is to be
returned, like a bond or certificate of stock, a bank is. a
bailee, and governed by the law pertaining to that relation.
In receiving money on general deposit, a bank is a debtor,
consequently when it is lost, no matter what may be the
cause, by improvident lending or theft, by fire or other
physical destruction, the bank must respond, just like an
ordinary borrower of money. Again, the depositor does not
expect to receive the identical money deposited, but other
money of equal value.2
Nevertheless, the law regards a general deposit as some-
thing more than a loan. If an individual should borrow
from another and spend all the money in one hour in
speculation or in betting at a horse-race, the lender would
have no cause of action against the borrower. He has not
a word to say concerning the borrower's use of his money,
unless an agreement concerning its use was made before
lending. But a bank, -notwithstanding its relationship to-
wards the creditor, can make no such free use of its bor-
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9. When can the deposit itself, or its substitute, be recovered.
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recovered.
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e. General deposit cannot be depleted to pay trust depositor.
f. A trust check must be returned if existing, or the amount if
collected, after bank's failure.
'Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252; Matter of Patterson, t8
Hun. 221: Doucs v. Phirnix Bank, 6 Hill, 297; Commercial Nat.
Bank v. Henningcr, ios Pa. 496; Kecne v. Collier, I Met. (Ky.) 415-
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rowed money. It is a borrower with restrictions on its
power to lend; and these flow out of the conception that
the bank, after all, is the keeper of the depositor's money,
and this conception is strengthened by the fact that nothing
is paid directly for the use of the loan.
While the authority of a bank to receive general deposits
has always existed, its authority to receive special deposits
has on some occasions been questioned,3 especially that of
national banking associations. 4 This was because the right
was not enumerated among their specific powers, but the
doubt was long ago settled in their favor.5
In like manner a bank has a right to receive the deposit
of a fund in controversy, to abide the event of.litigation or
an award, or to become payable on a .contingency to some
other person than the depositor.
An administrator, executor, guardian, or other trustee
may deposit funds in possession temporarily in a 'bank
while awaiting investment or distribution, partly for the
purpose of their safekeeping and partly to derive an income
therefrom.7 But he must exercise care in the selection of
a depository. In a recent case the court declared that the
trustee " will be held to that degree of care, at least, that
prudent and cautious business men ordinarily exercise in
their own affairs. But this duty is not discharged by deposit-
ing the funds in any bank. Nor .would it be by depositing
it without inquiry or investigation as to the standing of
the depository. He must have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve, and in good faith believe, the institution to be sol-
vent, before he deposits the estate's funds with it."
Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 47M.
'First Nat. Bank v. Ocean Nat. Bank, 6o N. Y. 278; Wiley v. First
Nat. Bank, 47 Vt. 546; Whitney v. First Nat. Bank, 5o Vt. 388; Mechler
v. First Nat. Bank, 42 Md. 581.
'First Nat. Bank v. Graham, Ioo U. S. 699; Patterson v. Syracuse
Nat. Bank, 8o N. Y. 82, containing a review of authorities; see also
First Nat. Bank v. Zent, 39 Ohio Ch. ioS.
'Bushnell v. Chautauqua Co. Nat. Bank, 74 N. Y. 29o; Kansas Nat.
Bank v. Quinton, 57 Kan. 750; Brown v. Kinsley Ex. Bank, 5z Kan.
.35; Anerican Nat. Bank v. Presnall, sS Kan. 69.
Germania Safety Vault and Trust Co. v. Driskel, 66 S. W. (Ky.)
61o
'Ibid.
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He must therefore exercise proper care in selecting the
depository.9 He should not select one -in another state.1 0
Having done this he is relieved, unless the institution at a
later period becomes unsafe and he is negligent in not learn-
ing of its changed condition. A deposit made by judicial
order furnishes complete protection.1
The deposit must be made in a way to indicate its true
trust character. A guardian or other trustee who makes
the deposit in his own name, whatever be his intention, is
liable for the consequences.12 "No matter what he intends
to do," says Justice Porter, "or what the cashier or clerk
may think he is doing, the deposits must wear the impress of
the trust. . . . He cannot so enter them as to call them his
own to-day if they are good, and to-morrow, if bad, ascribe
them to the estate, or shift them in an emergency from one
estate to another." 13 In some jurisdictions a less stringent
rule has been applied, but it ought not to be favored.14  Fur-
thermore, to permit the depositor to set aside the entry of
his deposit by showing that really the deposit belonged to
another, or vice versa, is a dangerous proceeding.15 Such
evidence might 'be safely used to show that a mistake had
been made in entering the deposit, but it ought not, we think,
to be employed for any other pgrpose.
A bank is not required to keep the deposits only of
those persons whom it wishes to serve, 6 and may close an
'In re Post's Estate, Myrick, Prob. (Cal.) 23o; In re Law's Estate,
144 Pa. 499; State v. Gooch, 97 N. C r86."State v. Gooch, 97 N. C. 186. The soundness of this position may
be questioned; the state fence is no protection. On one occasion a
guardian deposited his ward's money with a banking firm of which he
was a member, but the impropriety of the act was not questioned.
Ogburn v. Wilson, 93 N. C ix5 and 96 N. C. 211.
O'Hara v. Shepherd, 3 Md. Ch. 3o6. See State v. Gooch, 97 N. C
18&.
"Booth v. Wilkinson, -8 Wis. 6 5i; Williams v. Williams, WisL
3oo, reviewing many decisions; Mason v. Whitthorne, 2 Cald. (Tenn.)
242: Jenkins v. W|ailer, 8 Gill & J. 218; Norris v. Hero, 22 La. Atin. 6o5;
Robinson v. Ward, 2 Car. 8 Payne, 59. Contra, Parsley v. Martin, 77
Va. 376.
"McAlister v. Commonwealth, 3o Pa. 536; Estate of Law, 144 Pa.
4*Parsley v. Martin, 77 Va. 376; Beasley v. W~atson, 41 Ala. 234.
Parsley v. Martin, 77 Va. 376; Beasley v. WPatson, 41 Ala. 234.
"Thatcher v. Bank, 5 Sand. (N. Y.) z2i.
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account at any time by tendering the amount due to the
depositor and declining to receive more."T Some banks de-
cline to open accounts with depositors who are in every way
worthy because they do not expect to keep a deposit large
enough to be remunerative.
A bank has no right. to reeve a deposit when it is in-
solvent By common law as well as statute officers of
banks arj liable for receiving deposits when their institu-
tions are in this condition.18 Of late, statutes of this nature
have been generally enacted, which apply also to private
banks and bankers. Such legislation is constitutional, nor
is a statute declaring that the failure, suspension, or invol-
untary liquidation of a banker within a fixed period, thirty
days, for example, prima fade evidence of his intent to de-
fraud, unconstitutional in depriving him of the presumption
of innocence. 1'
In construing these statutes the place where the -deposit
was received is not essential,20 nor the receiver 21 If the
deposit were actually taken and received by the officers of
the bank knowing that itwas hopelessly insolvent, with the
intention of returning it,2 the wrongful deed has been com-
mitted; 23 the deposit, if still existing, can be recovered, and
the officers may be punished.2 4
Chicago Marine and Fire Ins Co. v. Stanford, 28 Ill. 168.see note 26.
'State v. Beach, 147 Ind. x74; Robertson v. People, 2o Colo. 279;
McClure v. People, 27 Colo. 358; Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56;
Brown v. People, 173 IlL 34; State v. Buck, 120 Mo. 479; Baker v.
State, 54 Wis. 368
In Alabama a statute providing that a banker who receives a deposit
knowing that he is insolvent is guilty of a misdemeanor is declared to
be a violation of the constitutional provision that no person shall be
liable for a debt: Carr v. State, io6 Ala. 35.
"State v. Yelser, 97 Iowa, 423; Carr v. State, 104 Ala. 4.
1 Carr v. State, mo4 Ala. 4; State v. Yct-er, 97 Iowa, 423; State v.
Eifert, 1o2 Iowa, 188; State v. Cadwell, 79 Iowa, 43a; State v. Sattlfy,
13x Mo. 464; Baker v. State, 54 Vis. 368.
Commonwealth v. Junkin, 17o Pa. 194, reversing i6 Pa. Co. Ct. z6.
'State v. Beach, i47 Md. 74; American Trust and Savings Bank
v. Gueder Adg. Co., iso Ill. 3356; First Nat. Bank v. Strauss, 66 Miss
479; Hyland v. Roe, izz Wis. 361; Richardson v. Denegre, 356 C. A.
452; Richardson v. N. 0. Debenture Redemption Co., 42 .C. A. 61g;
Richardson v. N. O. Coffee Co., 43 C. C A. 583.
'State v. Beach, 147 Md. 74; Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56;
Baker v. State, 54 W's 368.
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The two principal difficulties in executing these statutes
are, first: whether the bank was insolvent within the mean-
ing of the law at the time of receiving the deposit. The
general rule may be thus stated: The officers of a bank
who receive a check on deposit after it has become insolvent,
knowing that failure is impending, violate the law and must
answer for the consequences.25
In one of the many cases that might be mentioned the
Supreme Court of the United States declared that when a
bank has become hopelessly insolvent, and its president
knows that it is so, it is a fraud to receive deposits of checks
from an innocent depositor, ignorant of its condition, and he
can reclaim them or their proceeds.26 In a more recent case
the Circuit Court of Appeals said: "A banker who knows
that he is hopelessly insolvent cannot honestly continue
business and receiye money from his customers. He may
not intend to defraud a particular customer, but he will be
held, of course, to have intended the inevitable consequences
of his act-that is, to cheat and defraud all persons whose
money he receives and whom he fails to pay before he stops
business!' 27 And the offence is complete when the deposit
was received, whether this was before or after a prescribed
period of insolvency. The only effect of such a limitation
is, if a bank fails within the period prescribed, thirty days or
some other, after receiving the deposit, this is regarded as
prima facie evidence of an intention to defraud, but the
act- may be committed, though the deposit was received
before.28
'Cases under notes 2z and a3.
"St. Louis and San Francisco R. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566.
'Richardson v. New Orleans Coffee Co., 43 C. C. A. 583, 587; Lake
Erie R. v. Indianapolis Nat. Bank, 6s Fed. 69o; Peck v. First Nat.
Bank, 43 Fed. 357; Wasson v. Hawkins, 59 Fed. 233; Am. Trust and
Savings Bank v. Gueder Mfg. Co., iso IlL 336; Bank v. Gregg, 37 IlL
App. 425; First Nat. Bank v. Strauss, 66 Miss. 479; Higgins v. Hay-
den, 33 Neb. 61; Perth Amboy Gaslight Co. v. Middlesex Co. Bank,
6o N. J. Eq. 84; Manufacturcrs Nat. Bank v. Continental Bank, 148
Mass. 553; Grant v. Walsh, x45 N. Y.; Cragic v. Hadley, 99 N. Y.
133; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Loyd, go N. Y. 53o; Blair v. Hill, 5o
N. Y. App. Div. 33; State v. Sattley, 13i Mo. 164; Williams v. Cox, 99
Tenn. 403; Bruner v. Bank, 97 Tenn. 54o; McClure v. People, 27
Colo. 33&
=Lanterman v. Travous, 73 I1. App. 67o. Such a rule of evidence is
not unconstitutional. State v. Beach, x47 Ind. 74. The Illinois statute
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The nature of the act is not affected by the irregular or-
ganization of one's bank.29  An officer cannot thus shield
himself by his own wrong, or that of another officer who
has omitted, either intentionally or otherwise, to comply
with the law pertaining to the bank's organization. But
an officer who should receive deposits while having his bank
examined in good faith to find out whether or not it was
insolvent would not be guilty of fraud in so doing.30 Nor
should the knowledge of a managing officer of his bank's
insolvency be imputed to other officers who are less active.
To hold an officer he must be guilty of actual, and not simply
constructive, fraud.31
Notwithstanding the insolvency of a bank at the time
of receiving a deposit, and its deceptive and wrongful action,
its subsequent recovery may not be easy. This is the other
principal difficulty in executing the statutes pertaining to the
subject. The law is in a transitory stage; many of the
older decisions are no longer in harmony with the- newer
rules. To recover a deposit, on the ground that it ought not
to have been received, there must have been an actual deposit
as distinguished from the mere crediting of a check to the
depositor.32 But when an actual deposit of money, checks,
notes, or other property has been made, and is still in the
bank, it can be recovered by replevin or other appropriate
action.33  This rule is everywhere applied.
If the deposit has been received and can be traced, or
has become mingled with an existing fund, it can be re-
also applies to civil proceedings. Am. Trust and Savings Bank v.
Gueder Mfg. Co., i5o Ill. 336.
1 State v. Buck, 120 Mo. 479.
" Perth Amboy Gas-Light Co. v. Middlesex Co. Bank, 6o N. J. EQ.84.
n Quinn v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728; Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Mid-
dlesex Co. Bank, 6o N. J. Eq. 84; Stapleton v. Odell, 21 N. Y. Misc. 9.
See McClure v. People, 27 Colo. 358.
' Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank, 62 Kan. 788; Travellers'
Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 59 Kan. 156; Middland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell,
148 Mo. 358; Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Middlesex Co. Bank, 6o
N. J. Eq. 84; Sherwood v. Milford State Bank, 94 Mich. 78; Quinn Y.
Earle, 95 Fed. 728, 731.
" Com. Ex. Nat. Bank v. Solicitors' Loan and Trust Co., i88 Pa. 330;
Furber v. Stephens, 35 Fed. 17; Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131; In re
Commercial Bank; i Ohio N. P. 358.
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covered in an equitable action.34  Logically, therefore, a
portion of the fund that exists or can be traced into another
form can be recovered.3 5 This principle is everywhere
applied.
As money usually has no earmark, and when taken by
a bank is, except on rare occasions, mingled with the gen-
eral mass, the modern rule in many courts,36 though not
all,37 is if the general fund were increased by that amount,
it can be recovered or any portion that still exists. This
rule, doubtless, will everywhere prevail.
On the other hand, if the deposit has been paid out or
mingled with a larger fund from which many payments
have been made, and there is no clear evidence that the
deposit or any portion still remains in the general fund, a
similar amount cannot be recovered therefrom. To justify
such a segregation there must be satisfactory proof that
the deposit in controversy is still in the general fund. To
trace a deposit into such a fund will not suffice.38
Of course, this general fund is constantly changing, and
after the addition of a trust deposit the same as before.
But when payments are made after receiving a trust deposit,
the courts presume that the bank parts with its own m6ney
"National Bank. v. Insurance Co., 1o4 U. S. s4; St. Louis Brewing
Ass'n v. Austin, ioo Ala. 313; People v. City Bank, 96 N. Y. 32; Peale
v. Ellicott, 30 Kan. 156; Harrison v. Smith, 83 Mo. -2o; Guignon v.
First Nat. Bank, 22 Mont. 140, 145-
'Importers' and Traders' Nat. Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y. 272.
"Standard Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 2o C. C. A. 468; Metropolitan Nat.
Bank v. Campbell Com. Co., 77 Fed. 705; Myers v. Board of Education,
5z Kan. 87; Bishop. v. Mahoney, 70 Minn. 238, 24o; Cavin v. Gleason,loS N. Y. 256; Importers and Traders' Nat. Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y.
272; First Nat. Bank v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 259; Windstanley v.
Second Nat. Bank, 13 Ind. App. 544; Nurse v. Satterlee, 8z Iowa,
491, 495; Bradley v. Chesebrough, III Iowa. 26, I136; Carley v.
Graves, 85 Mich. 483; Sherwood v. Central Mich. Savings Bank, o3
Mich. iog; see Board of Fire Com'rs v. Wilkinson, rig Mich. 655;
Middland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358.
'Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed. 172; Little v. Chadwick,
:x Mass. iog; Slater v. Oriental Mills, 18 X I. 35.
Bishop v. Mahoney. 7o Minn. 238; In re Seven Corners Bank, 58
Minn. 5; Monotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237; Bradley v.
Chesebrough, III Iowa, x26; Slater v. Oriental Mills, 18 R. I. 352;
Board of Fire Com'rs v. Wilkinson, 9ig Mich. 65s; Richardson v.
Louistille Banking Co., 36 C. C. A. 3o7; see Guignon v. First Nat.
Bank, 22 Mont. i4o, 145.
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first, so that if the general fund has not been reduced below
the amount of the trust fund, it still remains.
39
Suppose the general fund is reduced by ordinary pay-
ments very considerably below the amount of the trust fund,
yet at the time of the bank's failure contains an equivalent
or even larger sum; as the trust fund to some extent has
surely been paid out, the replenished fund has a different
composition. On this question the courts again divide, some
holding that the trust depositor can recover only the balance
of the general fund when it was at the lowest point,40
assuming that this balance only was trust money; others
holding that the trust depositor can take all there was at the
time of the bank's failure,4 1 if need be, to pay his deposit,
because there is nothing wrong in law and morals in thus
paying the trust deposit. Is there any flaw in this reasoning
so long as the money used for restoring- the trust fund is
not taken from some other equally meritorious owner?
All will admit that a depositor who has been deluded
in making a deposit when a bank was insolvent has a higher
claim to recover than the depositor who put in his money
when the bank was in a flourishing condition. All will
agree that the wrongdoers should be punished, but it is
quite another thing to take the money from one class
of depositors to pay another class. The trust depositor has
indeed a higher claim against the bank; but is it just to
satisfy that claim by taking the amount in fact from another
innocent depositor? 42 As the Supreme Court of Iowa has
well said: 4  "That a person is a trust depositor does not
of itself entitle him to preference over general creditors.
To obtain that right, he must show by presumption of law
or otherwise that his fund has been preserved in the hands
of the assignee as an increase of the assets of the estate,
'Continental Nat. Bank v. lViens, 69 Tex. 489; Importers' and
Traders' Nat. Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y. 272; Bishop v. Mahoney, 70
Minn. 238; Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237; Board of
Fire Coin'rs v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 65..
' See Bishop v. Maloney. 70 Minn. 238, 240.
a Davenport Flour Co. v. Lamp. 80 Iowa, 722; see remarks on this
case in Jones v. Chesebrough. 7o5 Iowa, 303, 305. .
.Middland Nat. Bank v. Brightlwell, 148 Mo. 38 36-
'Bradley v. Chescbrough, in Iowa, x26, 136.
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from which it may be taken without infringement of the
rights of general creditors." In permitting a trust depositor
to recover his money it must be his, and not the deposit of
another. If his money has been paid out by the bank to
other depositors on their checks, payable to themselves or
to third parties, surely the bank in no sense is any longer
the actual possessor; on the other hand, if it were paid to
a borrower on a loan, who had not yet parted with it, the
depositor's right thereto by that rule would exist.
Legal presumptions have often served as valuable rules
in deciding cases, but injustice may be done by erroneous
application of them. When the fact-of a trust deposit is
not questioned the rule is clearly settled that it can be re-
covered if it, or its substitute, cap be traced into any other
form, or has become or remains a part of an existing fund.
But another rule must also be kept in sight-a fund be-
longing to another depositor, or to him in common with
trust depositors, cannot be diverted to pay exclusively one
class to the manifest loss of the other. Nor must the pre-
sumption we have been considering be employed to accom-
plish this purpose. It is an artificial presumption and should
never stand in the way of an inquiry into the facts. If they
fail to show what use was made of a trust deposit, the courts
should be slow to permit a recovery based solely on this
presumption. When a trust deposit has been mingled with
another fund and is truly there, it may be reclaimed by the
trust depositor, but when its existence rests on .a presumption
that is probably opposed to fact, or at best on uncertainty
respecting the retention or use of a trust deposit, a court
may well hesitate to give precedence to the claims of a trust
depositor on the slender basis of this presumption.
Three, classes of cases at least exist to which this pre-
sumption-should be dissimilarly applied:
(i,) Those in which the bank has no knowledge that the
deposit is a trust fund-for example, a deposit made by an
agent against his principal's express or implied direction in
his own name. Surely in such a case the bank would not
reserve the deposit in making payments. Suppose five
thousand dollars of trust money is mingled with a general
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fund of the same amount, and that. subsequently four
thousand dollars is paid out? If the bank at the time of re-
ceiving the trust money or afterwards, previous to its pay-
ment, did not know that it was trust money, or did know
and never returned it, is not the presumption much stronger
than the other that it made this payment indiscriminately
from the general fund without the slightest thought of the
source whence it came? If so, would not a juster rule
apportion this payment equally from the trust money and
the other two thousand dollars from each, instead of taking
it all from the original five thousand dollar fund, still leaving
the trust money intact besides a thousand dollars more?
(2) In like manner a bank may receive a trust deposit
knowing its true character, but, not regarding the law,
mingles it with its general fund and pays it out without
caring a whit about its legal obligations. Is not the applica-
tion of the presumption in this class of cases without a
reasonable basis?
(3) A third class of cases may be mentioned to which
the presumption may be properly applied, or in which the
fact may be shown, that the bank did seek to preserve the
trust deposit. But when a bank receives a deposit knowing
that it is in an insolvent condition, thus clearly violating the
law, is it reasonable to presume that it will make the slight-
est distinction in the use of its deposits?
This presumption has been made to serve a twofold pur-
pose-to preserve a fund for a trust depositor and to lessen
the wrong-doing of the bank officers in the receipt and use
of it. The facts in many a case in which this presumption
has been applied have shown that the officers were utterly
indifferent to the law in the general conduct of their bank;
is it not quite illogical, therefore, to maintain that in this
particular matter they sought to regard the law in the
interest of the true owner of the deposit? The only case
in which the presumption ought to be applied is the one
in which the bank knew, either at the time of receiving the
deposit or afterwards while it was in its possession, its true
trust character, and in the keeping and use of it sought
to observe the law.
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Do not these suggestions, dropped by the wayside of
discussion, clearly show that this artificial presumption
ought to be more carefully applied in the determination of
the rights of parties in these difficult controversies?
Lastly, checks received just before a bank's failure, in
violation of law, must be returned; and if they have been
sent away for collection, the proceeds always -belong -to
the depositor, though collected after the bank's failure."
When, however, they have been rightly received before its
failure and rightfully credited to the sender by reason of an
agreement to treat them in this manner, then the proceeds
can usually be kept by the collecting bank.
Albert S. Bolles.
"Levi v. National Bank, 5 Dill. io4; Commercial Nat. Bank v.
Armstrong, 148 L. S. 5o; Blair v. Hil, so N. Y. -App. 33; First Nat.
Bank v. Strauss, 66 Miss. 479; Richardson v. Denegre, 35 C. C. A.
452; Richardson v. N. 0. Coffee Co., 43 C. C. A:- 583; In re Havess,
8 Ben. 3o9; Guignon v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Mont. i4a.
